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What’s in a name? 
A history of New Zealand’s unique name 
suppression laws and their impact on 
press freedom
Abstract: The principle of open justice, including the media’s right to attend 
and report on criminal courts, must be balanced with the protection of indi-
viduals’ privacy and an accused person’s fair trial rights. Prohibiting media 
from identifying those involved in criminal cases is one way privacy and fair 
trial rights may be protected in New Zealand. Court news was not always 
restricted in this way: 115 years ago all parts of criminal court proceedings 
could be reported and media decided what information was censored. In 
1905, New Zealand judges were given the power to suppress court evidence 
to protect public morality, and 15 years later, the power to suppress the names 
of certain first offenders to give them a second chance. The laws now stretch 
to suppressing many kinds of evidence and the identities of some people ac-
cused and convicted of New Zealand’s most serious crimes. Investigation of 
the 115-year-long evolution of New Zealand’s name suppression laws illu-
minates a piecemeal, but severe, curtailment of media freedom and a trend of 
imposition of increasingly complex laws which journalists must keep abreast 
of, understand and observe to prevent appearing before the courts themselves.
Keywords: court reporting, contempt of court, crime reporting, fair trial 





THE PRINCIPLE of open justice, maintaining that justice should be trans-parent and open to the public, has been entrenched in British law for cen-turies (Davis, 2001; Pearson & Graham, 2010). New Zealand has firmly 
adopted the principle of open justice and, in most cases, allows media to be 
present and report in the criminal courts as public representatives (Buckingham, 
2011; Patel, 2018). The media’s role in court reporting is vital to the open justice 
principle by informing the public broadly about the operation of the judicial 
system (Pearson & Graham, 2010). The media’s right to report on criminal court 
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proceedings is supported by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBO-
RA) which stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to … seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form’ (NZBORA, s 14). In criminal 
court cases, however, name suppression orders may prevent media from identi-
fying some people. 
In New Zealand, name suppression is codified in legislation and either au-
tomatically applied or granted at judicial discretion. Name suppression has been 
controversial in New Zealand since it was introduced in the Offenders Probation 
Act 1920. Since then, academics, lawmakers and the judiciary have debated two 
broadly opposing interests involved with name suppression: individuals’ rights 
versus the principles of open justice (Davis, 2001; Jones, 1995; Patel, 2018; 
Pearson & Graham, 2010). On one hand, naming the accused may encourage 
participation of further witnesses or victims (Davis, 2001; Pearson & Graham, 
2010), be considered part of the punishment for offending, and deter reoffending 
(Jones, 1995). On the other hand, identifying the accused may damage reputations 
and/or cause distress and embarrassment (Pearson & Graham, 2010), and remove 
the presumption of innocence and thus destroy fair trial rights (Davis, 2001). Fair 
trial rights are also enshrined in NZBORA which states everyone has ‘the right 
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court’ (NZBORA, s 
25(a)). The words ‘fair’ and ‘public’ in section 25(a) aptly illustrate the conflict 
between the concepts of fair trial rights and the public’s right to know. Despite 
the importance placed on open justice in New Zealand, the most recent Justice 
Ministry figures show that in 2018/19 permanent name suppression was granted 
to 315 people, of whom 56 percent (n=176) were convicted and 18 percent (n=56) 
were imprisoned (Ministry of Justice, 2020). The names of those 315 people will 
never be allowed to be published in relation to those crimes, even after they have 
died, unless a court rescinds suppression. New Zealand’s more than 100-year 
journey to today’s name suppression laws has steadily restricted press freedom 
in reporting on criminal courts. Little has been written about the controversy 
that has surrounded New Zealand’s name suppression journey, the exclusion of 
media representatives from Parliamentary discussion over the formulation of the 
relevant legislation, or the arguable erosion of press freedom.
New Zealand’s suppression journey
New Zealand’s first legislation allowing suppression of criminal court evidence 
aimed to protect public morality and followed public outrage over unsavoury 
details published in newspapers about a man who impregnated a 15-year-old 
employee and escaped prosecution after she died during childbirth (A man’s 
iniquity, 1905). The Criminal Code Amendment Bill 1905, as then Justice Min-
ister James McGowan told the House, aimed to protect under 21-year-olds from 
exposure to morally corrupting information and prevent media reports ‘not of 
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an edifying character’ (McGowan, 1905, p. 238). Member of Parliament (MP) 
Charles Lewis had unsuccessfully argued for inclusion of name suppression 
in the bill, stating an acquitted person may be ‘damned for his lifetime be-
cause of what occurred’ (Lewis, 1905, p. 239). It appears from the Hansard 
transcript that although judges were consulted over the bill, the media was 
not (McGowan, 1905). Certain quarters of the media expressed outrage. The 
Lyttelton Times presciently warned the legislation would be the ‘first step to 
establishing a Press censorship in New Zealand’ (The Criminal Code Amend-
ment Bill, 1905). Hansard also showed some MPs disagreed with publication 
prohibitions, as newspapers generally complied with judicial requests not to 
publish details (McLean, 1905). However, the 1905 launch of the tabloid-style 
New Zealand Truth newspaper, noted for its ‘muck-raking’ (Papers Past, 2020), 
may have hardened some MPs’ opinions on media trustworthiness.  MP John 
Jenkins described the newspaper as ‘one of the vilest productions that ever 
issued from the printing press’ after it published evidence from an upcoming 
court case (Jenkins, 1905)(1). The Act, enacted on August 30, 1905, allowed 
judges to clear the court (to protect public morality) of everyone except the 
prosecutor, defence lawyer, accused, and, in a late addition, the media, and 
also to order certain evidence be suppressed from publication (Criminal Code 
Amendment Act 1905, ss 3 & 4). Recurring themes were beginning to emerge 
in the progression of suppression legislation—wilful antagonism toward media 
expressed by some MPs, and discounting of media interests and their potential 
to be sound moral agents. 
Prior to 1920, the media held the sole right to determine whose names were 
published in criminal court news. An informal agreement between most major 
newspapers stipulated that all accused persons would be named except for first 
offenders of drunkenness, children under 15 years in Juvenile Court, and debtors 
who successfully argued against imprisonment for unpaid debts (A flaw in the 
law, 1920). This all changed when, at the request of probation officers seeking to 
give young, first offenders a second chance, Justice Minister Ernest Lee included 
provision in the Offenders Probation Bill 1920 giving judiciary the power to sup-
press names of first offenders eligible for probation (Lee, 1920). In response, one 
newspaper editor warned that suppressing names of offenders would, ‘arouse in 
the public mind such suspicions … that there is one law for the rich and another 
for the poor’ (Very inadvisable, 1920). The Offenders Probation Act 1920 passed 
on October 28 that year. Some newspaper editors were vociferously opposed 
to the legislation. One described the law as a ‘hush-hush policy’ and warned 
that not naming ‘thieves and other lawbreakers’ would ‘undoubtedly encourage 
crime’ (The ‘hush-hush’ policy, 1920). The editor continued, ‘It is certainly time 
that the newspapers of the Dominion combined to protect their rights, which are 
gradually being filched from them’ (ibid.). One of the earliest name suppression 
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applications, on 24 November 1920, involved a 16-year-old girl who stole a 
wristwatch (The courts today, 1920). The magistrate declined name suppres-
sion saying he would instead just request that newspapers not name her (ibid.); 
newspapers did not publish her name. Name suppression was, however, granted 
on 21 December 1920 to mother-and-daughter first offenders who twice stole 
hats from a milliner (Not for publication, 1920). It appears that media, despite 
being upset with the new judicial powers, continued to cooperate with requests 
not to publish and also complied with name suppression orders; however, from 
the outset judicial application of the law was inconsistent.
Little advice had been provided to the judiciary about the application of name 
suppression (Local and General, 1921a). Magistrate Robert Dyer, in remarking 
that too many name suppression requests were being made, noted, ‘A law has 
been passed giving Magistrates the right to order the suppression of names, but on 
what basis we are to act I do not know’ (ibid.). Confusion about the practicalities 
of name suppression led some judges to set inconsistent boundaries. Magistrate 
Joseph Poynton declared: ‘The names will not be suppressed unless the offender 
is under 21 years, and is a first offender’ (Auckland Star, 1921). Two months later, 
Magistrate Samuel McCarthy took a narrower stance stating, ‘Mr Poynton has 
decided not to extend this provision of the non-publication of names to any over 
the age of twenty one, or beyond the first offence. In my opinion, that is too wide. 
I intend to confine it to juveniles under the age of sixteen’ (Local and General, 
1921b). Newspapers were also inconsistent in publication of names. In one 1923 
case, despite a judge explicitly requesting publication of the name of a convicted 
sex offender, the newspaper did not print his name (Grossly indecent act, 1923). 
The Waikato Times stated in an editorial that publication of names was the greatest 
deterrent to crime and congratulated one magistrate for refusing to suppress the 
name of a man charged with being drunk and disorderly; however, it did not name 
the accused (Day by day, 1924). NZ Truth, one of the greatest critics of name sup-
pression, in 1925 did not identify a woman convicted of stealing money from her 
employer, despite describing her lawyer’s unsuccessful name suppression request 
as ‘monumental cheek’ (Quite pardonable difference, 1925). The media’s failure 
to name some criminals, even in cases when judges allowed or recommended it, 
may indicate some editors’ growing discontent with the new laws and may have 
amounted to a protest against having to follow the courts’ rulings.
The media won a victory against the limitation of their freedoms in 1929 
when MP Rex Mason failed in a bid to introduce compulsory name suppression 
for almost all first offenders, (Offenders Probation Amendment Bill, 1929). The 
victory, however, was only won with the support of business groups (Local and 
General, 1929), and was only temporary. The following year name suppression 
was extended to include publication of ‘any other name or particulars likely to 
lead to the identification of such person’ (Offenders Probation Amendment Act 
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1930, s 2(2)). Justice Minister John Cobbe told the House some newspapers had 
published enough detail to easily identify persons granted name suppression 
(Cobbe, 1930). The Act made it contempt of court to breach name suppression, 
with a maximum fine of 100 pounds (Offenders Probation Act 1930, s 2(3)). 
The inclusion of identifying particulars to name suppression increased poten-
tial for a breach if media inadvertently published too much information. It also 
meant that if media felt suppression was unjustified they could no longer simply 
circumvent it by giving hints to identity. In just ten years, the media’s right to 
determine what information was published in court stories, had been seriously 
undermined. If editors retaliated by ignoring suppression orders they believed 
unjustified they faced being found in contempt of court and fines which could 
financially ruin them. 
The original intent of name suppression, to protect identities of first offend-
ers, changed significantly in 1954 when eligibility was extended to include those 
accused or convicted of any crime as long as they had no previous convictions 
for imprisonable offences (Criminal Justice Act 1954). Initially, Justice Minister 
Clifton Webb had intended name suppression to cover all people who appeared 
in court, but after media argued such broad suppression was against the public 
interest, agreed to reduce the scope (Webb, 1954). Despite Webb’s concession, 
antagonism towards the media’s position was again evident when MP John 
Stewart described the media’s response as ‘exaggerated as usual’ (Stewart, 1954, 
p. 1941). He accused newspapers of scaremongering by falsely claiming trials 
would be held in secret and stated newspapers had abused their privilege by sup-
pressing the identities of prominent figures and newspaper controllers’ friends 
while ruthlessly exposing the names of those they did not like (ibid.). Stewart’s 
claim, made without any supporting evidence, reveals a degree of enmity that 
likely shaped some lawmakers’ decisions about restricting media freedoms. 
In 1967 MPs finally fulfilled the wishes of some of their earlier counterparts 
and extended, at the request of the Law Society (Hanan, 1967), name suppression 
eligibility to all offenders (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1967, s 9). Justice 
Minister Ralph Hanan’s statement to the House indicated that, while all would be 
eligible for name suppression, it should be infrequently used (Hanan, 1967). Hanan 
described, in example, the possibility of revealing an incest victim’s identity because 
the accused was ineligible for name suppression (ibid.). The contention that MPs 
intended only occasional use of name suppression is supported by a statement made 
by MP Dr Martyn Findlay, who said while name suppression should be allowed 
for everyone, it should be used sparingly (Findlay, 1967). Name suppression laws 
were again to extended in 1969 to allow accused persons to apply for temporary, 
or interim, name suppression (Criminal Justice Amendment Act, 1969).
In 1975, a legislative change that automatically suppressed the names of 
every accused person, up until their case was concluded, brought media and MPs 
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to loggerheads. The change, a recommendation by the Criminal Law Reform 
Committee (CLRC), made up of the Solicitor General, law professionals, and 
representatives from government departments and universities, was the greatest 
alteration to reporting court news in New Zealand’s history (Eckersley, 2016; 
NZ move to suppress accused’s name, 1975). Government had initially intended 
automatic name suppression only for victims of sexual offences aged under 16 
years and those charged and/or convicted of incest with a child under 16 (Findlay, 
1974). When the bill returned for its second reading, however, the new clause 
had been added to automatically suppress the identities of all defendants up 
until conviction, unless the court ordered differently (Eckersley, 2016). Name 
suppression could be lifted if the accused requested it, or if any member of the 
public felt they or their family would be prejudiced if an accused’s name was 
not revealed (Criminal Justice Amendment Bill 1975, cl 14).
The proposal was opposed by not only media, but also a number of lawyers 
(NZ move to suppress accused’s name, 1975). Journalists claimed the proposed 
law meant that ‘no effective and sustained reporting of the case is possible’ 
and it would result in court news stories becoming mere lists of guilty parties 
(ibid.). Thirty-two public submissions were made on the bill, ten from media 
organisations or journalists, and all ten expressed opposition (Stace, 1976). The 
Press Council president warned of the dangers of secret trials; the editor of The 
Sunday News defended the public’s right to know about criminal matters; and 
journalists claimed court reports would be made confusing and dull (ibid.). The 
police commissioner, two other organisations representing police and the New 
Zealand Law Society also opposed the blanket suppression law (ibid.). Nonethe-
less, the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No.2) 1975 passed on September 19. 
Blanket suppression lasted only 10 months. During its time of enforce-
ment, MPs were suddenly exposed to one of its negative consequences when 
fellow MP Gerald O’Brien was charged with molesting two boys (Gay, 2019). 
Reports of O’Brien’s arrest, which could not include his name because of the 
suppression law, saw several other male MPs approach the media to declare the 
accused person was not them (ibid). The governing Labour Party was ousted 
at the 1975 general election and the new National Party government repealed 
the automatic suppression-for-all law, on 29 July 1976, returning the law to the 
1967 position where name suppression was available to all but only by order of 
a judge (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1976, s 2(1)). The 1976 act retained 
automatic suppression of names in specified sexual offences introduced by the 
repealed 1975 act (ibid, ss 2 & 3). 
Further extensions of name suppression were to follow in subsequent years. 
Automatic name suppression was extended to: members of the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service (except the director), and anyone connected with 
them (New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 1977); and 
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all victims of sexual offending (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1980, s 23). 
Each extension of name suppression legislation meant further erosion to press 
freedom, and an ever-growing and complex number of situations where media 
might inadvertently breach an order, particularly when these were automatic and 
not vocalised in court by the judge. 
In 1982, for the first time, media could be ordered to leave the court during 
closed court hearings, but only in the interests of national security or defence 
(Crimes Amendment Act 1982, s 4(1)). The legislation did not give journalists 
the right to challenge an order to leave court and, as the hearing was closed, they 
could not subsequently determine whether the order was justified. 
Extension after extension to name suppression continued over subsequent 
years, each making the laws more complex and each concealing further informa-
tion from the public. In 1985 judges were given power to suppress the names and 
identifying particulars of witnesses and any evidence given during times when 
the court was closed and also any person’s address and occupation (Criminal 
Justice Act 1985, ss 138 & 140). Additionally, a different act prohibited disclosure 
in open court of the names and addresses of victims of, and parties to sexual 
violation-related crimes; inducing sexual connection by coercion; and compel-
ling another to do an indecent act with an animal, effectively suppressing these 
from publication by media (Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2) 1985, s 23AA). In 
1986, undercover police officers were also granted a form of anonymity when, in 
giving court evidence in serious or most drug-related crimes, they were allowed 
to use the fictitious names used during the investigation (Evidence Amendment 
Act 1986, s 2; Summary Proceedings Amendment Act 1986, s 4). In 1989, auto-
matic name suppression was extended to cover witnesses aged under 17 years 
in criminal cases (Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, s 454). 
In 1995, those ordered to submit a sample for DNA testing were also granted 
automatic name suppression unless they were charged with an offence relating 
to the reason for the test (Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995, 
s 14). The Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 1997 allowed some 
witnesses in serious criminal trials to be identified only as ‘Witness A’ or another 
initial (ibid., s 3). A breach of witness anonymity attracted much harsher pun-
ishment than other suppression breaches: a maximum of seven years in prison 
for a deliberate breach, and maximum fines of $2000 for individuals or $10,000 
for bodies corporate for an accidental breach (ibid.). One difficulty in witness 
anonymity was that mandated anonymity included a witness’s address, occupa-
tion and other identifying particulars (ibid.) making it sometimes difficult for 
journalists to write about the witness without inadvertently revealing too much 
information. The need to give context to witnesses, while also avoiding breach-
ing anonymity, and potential harsh penalties, added considerable complexity to 
reporting such cases.
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Inconsistencies in the application of name suppression and concern over 
erosion of open justice and press freedom led to a major review of suppression 
laws in 2008 (New Zealand Law Commission, 2008). Some review submitters 
stated name suppression had become so common it was granted on first ap-
pearance ‘almost as a matter of course’ (New Zealand Law Commission, 2009, 
p. 18). Prominent people were also more likely to be given name suppression, 
some claimed (ibid). The commission made 35 recommendations to government 
(ibid.), many of which were included in the subsequent Criminal Procedure Act 
2011, including a guide for judges on grounds for granting name suppressions. 
The guide included consideration that refusal would: cause ‘extreme hardship’ to 
the defendant or others; cast suspicion on others; endanger any person; identify 
another person whose name is suppressed; risk ongoing, or other, investiga-
tions; prejudice the security or defence of the nation; and create a real risk of 
prejudicing a fair trial (Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 200 (2)). The act also 
stipulated that a defendant being well-known did not constitute ‘extreme hardship’ 
(ibid., s 200 (3)). In 2011, for the first time, the media was granted the right to 
challenge name suppression orders in court (ibid, s 210). This was a significant 
development acknowledging the media was a party to proceedings, and giving 
journalists the right to stand up in court and oppose a name suppression order. 
However, some journalists lacked the experience, confidence and legal skills 
to present a compelling case. The legislation also required judges to provide 
reasons for granting name suppression; however, the reasons themselves could 
also be suppressed in exceptional circumstances (ibid., s 207). In some cases, 
suppression of reasons for suppression has placed the onus on media to explain 
why open justice principles cannot be upheld (Hurley, 2019). The 2011 act also 
granted automatic name suppression to victims in criminal cases aged under 18 
years, unless they were dead, and increased the age for automatic suppression for 
witnesses by one year to cover those aged under 18 years (Criminal Procedure 
Act, 2011, s 204).
Juvenile offenders
Some of the most stringent of New Zealand’s suppression laws relate to chil-
dren and young offenders. Special Children’s Court sessions were introduced in 
1906 for offenders aged under 16 years, and, while hearings could be closed to 
the public, reporters could remain and publish all details of the cases (Juvenile 
Offenders Act 1906). Automatic name suppression for offenders aged under 16 
years, their parents or guardians and any other name which could identify the 
child was introduced in Children’s Court in 1925, with journalists having to 
seek permission to be present and to publish stories (Child Welfare Act 1925, s 
30(2)). The age for being considered a juvenile offender was increased in 1927 
to those aged under 17 years (Child Welfare Amendment Act 1927, ss 22 & 27). 
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In 1974, automatic suppressions in the renamed Youth Court were extended 
to include the name of the accused’s school (Children and Young Persons Act 
1974, s 24). In 1982, automatic suppressions were removed for youths aged 
15 years or over sentenced as an adult in a District Court for serious crimes 
(Children and Young Persons Amendment Act 1982, s 6). Youth Court auto-
matic suppressions were again extended in 1989 to include the names of vic-
tims (Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, s 329). The strict 
suppression laws for young offenders echo the calls of those 1920 probation 
officers who justifiably fought for a second chance for young people; however, 
complexities of reporting proceedings and these strict laws have resulted in 
much of the Youth Courts’ work going unreported. 
Other suppressions
In addition to the automatic and discretionary name suppressions outlined 
above for criminal courts, there are numerous other suppressions which add 
complexity for journalists and many more possibilities for accidental suppres-
sion breaches. These include suppressions around bail hearings; questions dis-
allowed by a judge; anything said in court while the jury is not present; Family 
Court proceedings; and tribunal hearings (Cheer, 2015). While many of these 
suppressions have valid reasons, they are also arguably symptomatic of grow-
ing and wide-ranging restrictions on press freedom. 
Where to from here
The new Contempt of Court Act 2019, expected to come into effect on 26 Au-
gust 2020, has codified some legal constraints and made some laws clearer for 
journalists working in criminal courts. The Act has, however, added other prob-
lems by codifying the ability for judges to order media to remove from websites 
stories that might prejudice a fair trial. A timeframe has been stipulated for the 
sub judice period, the time in which information that poses a ‘real risk’ to a fair 
trial cannot be published (Contempt of Court Act 2019, s 7). Under the new act 
the sub judice period is codified, for serious offences, as being from the time 
of arrest or charge, whichever happens first, through to: a guilty plea or jury 
verdict; when a charge is withdrawn or dismissed; or the start of a judge alone 
trial (ibid.). Previously, sub judice applied from the imprecise time of ‘when 
an arrest was imminent’, and while ‘time of arrest or charge’ is more concrete, 
journalists are generally reliant on this information being provided by authori-
ties. Information which poses a ‘real risk’ to a fair trial is also defined in the act, 
meaning journalists have a list to refer to rather than relying on previous case 
law (ibid., s 8). Another major change is the codification of takedown orders 
relating to stories which include a defendant’s previous convictions or informa-
tion that might risk a fair trial (ibid.). While takedown orders only apply to the 
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sub judice period, the possibility is raised that once the information is removed, 
it may not be reinstated due to cost and time constraints, resulting in a de facto 
kind of lasting censorship. While takedown orders for online news websites 
have been granted in recent years, these have been limited. It is possible that 
enshrining the option of takedown orders in legislation could see lawyers seek-
ing these much more frequently with a consequent rise in the number of these 
orders served on news media. So far there has been little reaction from media to 
the new act, arguably because it has yet to come into effect so the implications 
have not been tested.
International context
In comparison to the straightened New Zealand context, Australia has no bill of 
rights founded protection of freedom of speech or a public and fair trial (Pear-
son, 2010). Name suppression is available in Australian courts; however, prac-
tices vary considerably across the country’s nine states and territories (Pearson, 
2010) and are unequally applied. Ackland (2018) reports in the 49 weeks to 8 
December 2018 a total of 703 name suppression orders were made, the great-
est number in Victoria (301) and the lowest in Tasmania, Australian Capital 
Territory and Western Australia (1 each). Australia’s states have numerous and 
varying provisions for suppression orders although in all, names of victims of 
sexual offences and child defendants are automatically protected. These legis-
lative differences pose problems for journalists whose publications cross state 
boundaries (Pearson, 2010). 
The United Kingdom’s name suppression regime is a mixture of common 
and statutory law. Judges may order the names of participants in criminal cases 
not be used in open court if there is a real risk to the administration of justice, 
and, thus, these names cannot be published (Judicial College, 2016). Judges also 
have discretion to suppress the names of certain people involved in criminal 
proceedings. Automatic name suppressions apply to victims of sexual offences 
and children involved in Youth Court proceedings (except in cases involving 
breach of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order). Defendants in criminal trials must 
be named except in rare circumstances (ibid.). Courts may also order a post-
ponement of publication of reports of proceedings if there is a significant risk 
to the administration of justice (ibid.). Postponement orders are not intended to 
permanently prevent publication (Crown Prosecution Service, 2018). 
In Canada, freedom of expression is protected by the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Canada has a number of statutory suppressions, called 
publication bans, few of which are automatic (Canadian Judicial Council, 2007). 
Automatic, permanent suppression is given to victims of, and witnesses to, 
sex-related crimes, and young people aged under 17 in the Youth Court, except 
if they are sentenced as an adult (ibid.). Reihle (1996) states free expression 
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is often restricted by the scope and extent of publication bans. Similarly, the 
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression organisation argues that publication 
bans are too broadly and frequently used and stifle public discussion about the 
justice system (Metcalfe, 2018). 
In the United States of America, the media’s right to report in the courts is 
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, which enshrines press 
freedom. According to Brandwood (2017), American judges have few options 
for preventing publication of court proceedings. Judges have the ability to issue 
gag orders preventing lawyers and others involved in cases from speaking to the 
media and, if they believe publicity may risk a person’s fair trial rights, they may 
order a trial be held in another venue. Brandwood (2017) suggests that in the 
USA some accused persons do not get a fair trial due to unrestrained publicity. 
This poses an extreme contrast to the situation in New Zealand.
Conclusion
The development of New Zealand’s name suppression laws are disquieting on 
a number of fronts. At the beginning of last century, New Zealand’s media were 
entrusted with deciding what information was or was not published from crimi-
nal court hearings in the public interest, but over the past 115 years that free-
dom has steadily been eroded. The initial intent of suppression was to protect 
public morality, then turned to also give young first offenders a second chance. 
The practice of name suppression has ballooned to now offer anonymity to 
those accused, or convicted, of a wide range of crimes, and others involved in 
court cases. While some name suppressions are warranted, particularly for the 
protection of victims of sex-related crimes and young people, other measures 
appear to have been developed by politicians through an unfounded but long-
standing mistrust and enmity towards the media. 
Media were for decades excluded from any formal discussion of, or contri-
bution to, the early legislative development of New Zealand’s name suppression 
laws, which effectively, without consultation, eroded the media’s freedom and 
right to determine which information was in the public interest. The continued 
development and extension of name suppression laws has seen them become 
increasingly complex and disjointed. For example, several acts include automatic 
name suppressions that apply to rare situations, creating pitfalls into which 
even seasoned journalists, without the benefit of specialist court knowledge, 
could easily stumble. The most recent legislative moves have solved some of 
the problems of interpreting a small area of suppression-related legislation, but 
other problems still loom large. The effect of the raft of court-ordered and codi-
fied name suppressions is the restriction of New Zealand’s media in a way that 
is extremely unusual in comparison to other Western nations. 
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Notes
1. Unfortunately, no 1905 copies of Truth exist in any library so what exactly incensed 
Jenkins cannot be read.
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